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THE DEGENERALIZATION OF THE
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
(GSP): QUESTIONING THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE U.S. GSP
AMY M. MASON
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, developing countries have expressed increasing
frustration with their status in the international trade regime. The
Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations
notoriously collapsed in September 2003 amidst developing-country
dissatisfaction with proposed access to developed-country markets.1
So, too, developing countries have criticized WTO rulings allowing
developed countries to impose import restrictions based on
environmental considerations.2 Most recently, India challenged the
Copyright © 2004 by Amy M. Mason.
1. Stephen J. Glain, For Poor Nations, a Pyrrhic Victory—Economists Say Show of
Strength at WTO Summit Will Hurt in End, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2003, at Fl. The WTO
does not define “developing” or “developed country,” and countries may choose to define
themselves as one or the other. WTO, Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal). However, international law commentators broadly define
“developed countries” as the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation:
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1338 (1996). “Developing” countries are,
by default, all countries not part of the group of “developed” countries. E.g., Andrew Guzman
& Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement
at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S205 app. C at S235 (2002). In contrast,
“least-developed countries” are explicitly recognized as such by the United Nations. WTO,
Least-Developed Countries, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
2. See Donald McRae, Trade and the Environment: Competition, Cooperation or
Confusion?, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 745, 757 (2003) (noting developing-country suspicion of
developed countries’ environmental concerns after the Shrimp-Turtle ruling, WTO Appellate
Body Report on United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/WT/DS/58ABR.DOC, which authorized the United States to restrict the importation of
shrimp harvested without adequate protections for sea turtles).
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European Communities’ (EC’s) Generalized System of Preferences
3
(GSP), through which the EC offers preferential market access to the
exports of developing countries. The international GSP framework,
premised on the belief that preferential tariffs encourage export
growth and facilitate economic development,4 authorizes developed
WTO members to provide developing countries with tariffs lower
than the tariffs provided to other developed nations. As such, the
GSP is the primary vehicle by which developed countries have
implemented their commitment to “special and differential
treatment” for developing countries.5
Over the course of the GSP’s thirty-year existence, both
developing countries and scholars have lamented developed-country
efforts, especially the efforts of the United States, to differentiate
6
among developing countries in granting GSP benefits. Scholars
contend that the threat of removal or reduction of GSP benefits
eviscerates the very purpose of the GSP—providing incentives for

3. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities—Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter EC—GSP Appellate Body Report], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246ABR.doc.
4. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, “Differential and More Favourable Treatment”: The GATT
Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488, 492–93 (1980) (justifying the GSP on economic
grounds).
5. “Special and differential treatment” is a cornerstone of the ongoing round of
multilateral trade negotiations. See WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
para. 44 (Nov. 14, 2001) (“We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are
an integral part of the WTO Agreements.”), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
6. See, e.g., FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL
THEORY OF JUST TRADE 156–68 (2003) (concluding that egalitarian fairness principles, such as
Rawls’s “justice as fairness,” oblige developed countries to provide unconditional and
nonexclusive trade preferences to developing countries); ÇAGLAR ÖZDEN & ERIC REINHARDT,
THE PERVERSITY OF PREFERENCES: GSP AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE POLICIES,
1976–2000, at 21 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2955, 2003) (noting that the
“political process leading to GSP decisions” prevents developing countries from building their
export sectors for fear that preferences will be removed), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/23188_wps2955.pdf; Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality:
Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975, 1033 (2000) (contending
that it is morally unjustifiable for developed countries to terminate GSP preferences for political
reasons); Robert Howse, India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the
European Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major
Repercussions for “Political” Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 385, 395
(2003) (noting “persistent concern by developing countries about conditionality and selectivity
in GSP schemes”); Peter Lichtenbaum, “Special Treatment” vs. “Equal Participation:” Striking a
Balance in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003, 1015–16 (2002) (highlighting
the detrimental effects of conditionality in the U.S. GSP).
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developing countries to invest in industrial capacity. Likewise,
developing countries point to the obvious economic consequences of
differentiation among GSP recipients; India’s recent challenge to the
EC’s scheme was prompted by the $300 million that its exporters
were allegedly losing annually because of the EC’s more favorable
GSP treatment for Pakistan.8 Until recently, these criticisms fell on
deaf ears, partly because developing countries did not dare officially
challenge GSP schemes9 and partly because developed countries
10
firmly believed that differentiation was permissible.
Much of the criticism of GSP schemes has focused on the U.S.
GSP, which is the most conditional—and hence controversial—of any
scheme. Differentiation in the U.S. GSP takes three forms: one, the
United States provides more favorable preferences to groups of
11
developing countries; two, it withdraws GSP preferences entirely if
developing countries fail to meet certain conditions;12 and, three, it
“graduates” beneficiaries from its GSP when those countries are
13
sufficiently competitive. In a recent ruling on the EC’s GSP scheme,

7. See GARCIA, supra note 6, at 157 (“[GSP] programs . . . are subject to periodic renewal,
and within each program the beneficiaries must continually re-qualify for the preferences. This
creates problems for business and investment planners on both sides of the preference.”);
ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6, at 21 (“Since ‘he who giveth may taketh away,’ the nonguaranteed nature of GSP Preferences prevents the recipients from fully focusing on their
export sectors.”).
8. See MISSION OF INDIA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REPORT FOR
JANUARY, 2003, at 10 (2003) (“Pakistan’s inclusion in the scheme costs India over $300 million a
year in lost trade . . . .”), available at http://www.cii-eu.org/ecreports/jan2003.pdf.
9. See Kyle Bagwell et al., The Boundaries of the WTO: It’s a Question of Market Access,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 71 (2002) (speculating that developing countries refrained from
challenging GSP schemes to stay “on good terms” with donors).
10. See Robert Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but Not Quite Yet:
India’s Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the European Union’s
Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2003) (“[I]t was . . .
conventional wisdom that conditions . . . could be placed on voluntary and non-binding
preferences granted to developing countries under the Generalized System of
Preferences . . . .”).
11. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2466a (2000) (providing additional GSP benefits for eligible subSaharan African countries); see also Council Regulation 2501/2001, art. 10, 2001 O.J. (L 346) 1, 5
(authorizing additional GSP preferences for twelve countries participating in the EC’s special
arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking).
12. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(A) (prohibiting the granting of U.S. GSP preferences
to some Communist countries); see also Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art.
26.1(c), 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 9 (withdrawing, on a temporary basis, preferences from countries
failing to protect certain labor standards).
13. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (requiring the withdrawal of GSP benefits from countries
that the World Bank designates as “high income” countries); see also Council Regulation
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the WTO Appellate Body questioned the legitimacy of the first form
of differentiation, concluding that developed countries may not
discriminatorily provide additional GSP preferences to some GSP
14
beneficiaries. Although the Appellate Body did not rule on the
remaining two types of differentiation—complete withdrawal of
beneficiary status on the basis of certain conditions and the
graduation of competitive beneficiaries—its reasoning nonetheless
sheds light on the legitimacy of these types of differentiation in the
U.S. GSP.
This Note develops the Appellate Body’s reasoning with respect
to all three types of differentiation in the U.S. GSP. From this
reasoning, the Note derives a framework under which graduation and
some conditionality mechanisms in the U.S. scheme are probably
legitimate, whereas other conditionality mechanisms and
discriminatory regional schemes are probably not. Part I describes the
legislative history of the GSP system, focusing on the relevant legal
instruments established in the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).15 Part II outlines the U.S. GSP,
emphasizing the mechanisms by which it provides additional
preferences to regional groups, withdraws preferences entirely if
countries fail to comply with certain conditions, and graduates
recipients. Part III then summarizes the recent Appellate Body
Report. Finally, Part IV proposes a framework for analyzing the
legitimacy of regional preferences, conditionality, and graduation in
the U.S. GSP.
I. THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES IN UNCTAD,
THE GATT, AND THE WTO
The GATT international trade framework was founded on the
twin pillars of nondiscrimination and reciprocity.16 The cornerstone of

2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 2–3 (removing GSP eligibility in the EC
scheme on the basis of World Bank classification and certain calculations).
14. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 190.
15. The GATT is the predecessor organization to the WTO, which was established in 1994.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE
LEGAL TEXTS—THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (establishing a
new multilateral trading system encompassing the GATT).
16. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, pmbl., 61 Stat. A-11, A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196 [hereinafter GATT] (expressing the founding governments’ desire to
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the nondiscrimination principle is the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN)
Clause of Article I:1 of the 1947 GATT Agreement, which mandates
that all advantages granted to one country “be accorded immediately
17
and unconditionally” to like products from other countries. Despite
the fundamental importance of Article I:1 to the GATT framework,
the GATT members deviated from its requirements soon after the
founding of the GATT18 to provide special and differential treatment
to developing countries.
Special and differential treatment, which WTO members have
recognized as a key principle of international trade,19 alters the
foundational requirements of reciprocity and nondiscrimination for
developing countries. On the one hand, developed countries have
recognized that they “do not expect reciprocity for [tariff]
commitments made by them in trade negotiations” with developing
countries.20 On the other hand, through the GSP, developed countries
may favor developing countries in extending tariff preferences—that
is, they may charge lower tariffs on imports from developing
countries—notwithstanding the MFN obligation of Article I:1.21 This
Part outlines the evolution of the GSP and the legal instruments
governing its implementation.
A. Origins of the Generalized System of Preferences
In the 1960s, developing countries began advocating the
establishment of a system of preferential tariffs to promote the
22
development of infant industries in developing countries. Because
“enter[] into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce”).
17. Id. art. I:1.
18. Lichtenbaum, supra note 6, at 1007.
19. See WTO Agreement pmbl. (“T]here is need for positive efforts designed to ensure
that developing countries . . . secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development.”).
20. GATT art. XXXVI:8. Article XXXVI was added to the GATT in 1965. Protocol
Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and
Development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977, 572 U.N.T.S. 320.
21. Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28. 1979, para. 1, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at
203, 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
22. See Thomas R. Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing
Countries: International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 513, 514–15
(1978) (describing the first proposal for such preferences from Raúl Prebisch, Secretary General
of UNCTAD).

MASON FINAL.DOC

518

6/6/2005 10:38 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:513

developing-country markets were too small to support the
development of manufacturing industries, these countries clamored
for temporary preferential access to developed markets to nurture
23
such industries. At the First Session of UNCTAD in 1964, developed
countries, led by the United States, opposed developing-country
24
initiatives in support of such preferences. By UNCTAD’s Second
Session (UNCTAD II) in 1968, however, the developed countries,
including the United States, came to support the general principle of
a system of preferences but did not agree on its details.25 The
UNCTAD II participants adopted Resolution 21(II), recognizing
“unanimous agreement in favour of the early establishment of a
mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and nondiscriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to the
developing countries.”26 The Resolution established a Special
27
Committee on Preferences to work out the details of this system.
In the Special Committee, developed and developing countries
negotiated the details of unilateral GSP schemes proposed by
28
individual developed countries. In 1970, the Committee adopted the
Agreed Conclusions, confirming that the proposed schemes, as
revised during the negotiations, were “mutually acceptable” to both

23. Anthony N. Cole, Note, Labor Standards and the Generalized System of Preferences:
The European Labor Incentives, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 179, 188 (2003).
24. See Kelé Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the
European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 425, 448 (1994) (describing
developed-country opposition to the developing world’s arguments for the establishment of
preferential tariffs); Graham, supra note 22, at 516 (highlighting the United States’ role in this
opposition).
25. Onyejekwe, supra note 24, at 449. Two factors prompted the United States to support
the concept of the GSP. One, it was facing increasing pressure from the Latin American
countries to implement a preferential system similar to that of the EC. Graham, supra note 22,
at 516. Two, it “saw in the GSP an opportunity to halt the trend towards cartelization of world
trade through exclusive preferential arrangements.” Id. at 516–17.
26. Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on Its Second
Session, U.N. TDBOR, 2d Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 11, at 38, U.N. Doc. TD/97/Annexes
(1968), reprinted in WTO Panel Report on European Communities—Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003)
[hereinafter EC—GSP Panel Report], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/WT/DS/246R-00.doc, annex D-3, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/
WT/DS/246R-04.doc.
27. Id. para. 2.
28. For an overview of the content of the initial submissions, see generally R.
Krishnamurti, Tariff Preferences in Favour of Developing Countries, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 447
(1970).
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29
developed and developing countries. The Agreed Conclusions also
affirmed the legitimacy of several key principles of the schemes. First,
they expressed the consensus that “all developing countries should
participate as beneficiaries from the outset,”30 with beneficiary status
determined according to the principle of self-election.31 Second, the
Conclusions explicitly permitted a priori limitations on the quantity of
32
goods that could be imported through the GSP. Finally, the
Conclusions acknowledged the temporary, nonbinding nature of the
tariff preferences and conditioned the establishment of the system on
obtaining the necessary GATT waivers.33

B. The 1971 Waiver Decision
In 1971, the GATT members waived the MFN requirement for
ten years “to the extent necessary to permit developed contracting
parties . . . to accord preferential tariff treatment to products
originating in developing countries . . . with a view to extending to
such countries and territories generally the preferential tariff
treatment referred to in the Preamble to this Decision.”34 The
preamble described such tariff treatment as “a mutually acceptable
system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory
preferences beneficial to the developing countries” as agreed to at
UNCTAD II.35 The preamble also recognized that the granting of
tariff preferences was not a binding commitment on the part of the
36
developed countries.

29. Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee on Preferences, U.N. TDBOR, 4th Sess.,
267th mtg., Annex 1, para. I.9, U.N. Doc. TD/B/330 (1970) [hereinafter Agreed Conclusions],
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1083, 1084 (1971).
30. Id. para. II.1.
31. Id. para. IV.1. The principle of self-election means simply that countries will elect to be
deemed “developing” for purposes of receiving GSP benefits. Onyejekwe, supra note 24, at 457.
The principle assumes that countries will not make such an election without bona fide grounds
for doing so. Id.
32. Agreed Conclusions, supra note 29, paras. III.1–4.
33. Id. para. IX.2.
34. Waiver Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GATT
B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972) [hereinafter 1971 Waiver]. The waiver is generally understood
to rest on GATT Article XXV:5, which authorizes waivers “[i]n exceptional circumstances,”
even though the waiver does not explicitly refer to this article. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, The
WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European Community’s GSP Program,
6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 512 (2003) (discussing the adoption of the 1971 waiver); Yusuf, supra
note 4, at 491 (same).
35. 1971 Waiver, supra note 34, pmbl.
36. Id.
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C. The Enabling Clause
Faced with the upcoming expiry of the ten-year waiver, in 1979
the GATT members adopted the Decision on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of
37
Developing Countries (Enabling Clause). The Enabling Clause
permits
preferential
treatment
for
developing
countries
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General
Agreement.”38
The central provision of the Enabling Clause is paragraph 2(a),
which expressly authorizes the provision of tariff preferences to
developing countries “as described in [the 1971 waiver], relating to
the establishment of ‘generalized, non-reciprocal and non39
discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries.’”
This reference to the 1971 waiver, contained in footnote three,
directly links the Enabling Clause to the GSP system initiated at
UNCTAD II.40 The Enabling Clause also authorizes several other
types of preferential treatment, such as regional arrangements among
developing countries to reduce tariffs,41 special treatment for the
42
least-developed countries, and nontariff measures governed by
instruments negotiated under the GATT.43
Several additional provisions of the Enabling Clause clarify the
obligations of both developed and developing countries participating

37. Enabling Clause, supra note 21.
38. Id. para. 1.
39. Id. para. 2(a) n.3.
40. Until the recent Appellate Body decision, see supra note 3, this linkage had fueled
scholarly debate as to whether the 1971 waiver’s preamble imposed binding conditions on GSP
schemes. At least one commentator reasoned that footnote three’s reference was merely
aspirational. See Howse, supra note 10, at 1352–53 (interpreting the conditions as nonbinding);
Howse, supra note 6, at 394 (same). In contrast, other commentators concluded that it was
binding. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 34, at 520 (arguing that, although the preamble to the 1971
waiver was aspirational, the Enabling Clause converted these aspirational conditions into
binding requirements); William J. Davey & Joost Pauwelyn, MFN Conditionality: A Legal
Analysis of the Concept in View of Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with
Particular Reference to the Issue of “Like Product”, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 13, 24–25 (Thomas Cottier &
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (noting disagreement as to the nature of these conditions but
pointing to the preamble of the 1971 waiver as an indication that they were binding); Yusuf,
supra note 4, at 495 (asserting that developed countries offering preferences could neither
discriminate among developing states nor demand reciprocal concessions).
41. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(c).
42. Id. para. 2(d).
43. Id. para. 2(b).
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in GSP schemes. Paragraph 3(c) requires that preferential treatment
for developing countries “be designed . . . to respond positively to the
44
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.”
Similarly, developed countries may not seek concessions inconsistent
with the needs of developing countries45 and may not use preferences
“to create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting
46
parties.” In contrast, as their economies develop, developing
countries are expected to “participate more fully in the framework of
47
rights and obligations under the General Agreement.”
II. THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
As of 2002, sixteen countries had implemented GSP schemes.48
The U.S. GSP was enacted in the 1974 Trade Act, which authorizes
the president to eliminate tariffs on imports from eligible developing
countries.49 In designating eligible products and countries, the
president is to consider four overarching factors: the anticipated
effect on the economic development of the country in question, the
extent to which other developed countries are granting such
preferences, the impact on U.S. producers of like products, and the
competitiveness of the beneficiary country.50
The U.S. scheme limits the products eligible for GSP treatment.
In 2000, only 47 percent of imports from GSP beneficiary countries
51
received preferential access under the GSP. All eligible articles
52
receive duty-free access, but certain import-sensitive products, such
44. Id. para. 3(c).
45. Id. para. 5.
46. Id. para. 3(a).
47. Id. para. 7. Commentators argue that this provision justifies the “graduation” of highincome developing countries from GSP schemes. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. MCMAHON,
AGRICULTURAL TRADE, PROTECTIONISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT: A LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 129–30 (1992). For examples of graduation mechanisms in GSP schemes, see infra
note 92 and accompanying text.
48. The sixteen countries are Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic,
the EC, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Slovak
Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev.,
About GSP, at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
49. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 501–505, 88 Stat. 1978, 2066–71 (1974)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461–2467 (2000)). For a detailed discussion of the
enactment of the U.S. GSP, see generally Graham, supra note 22.
50. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2000).
51. ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6, at 5.
52. 19 U.S.C. § 2461.
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as some textiles, watches, footwear, and certain electronic, steel, and
53
glass products, are excluded from eligibility. Furthermore, the Trade
Act imposes “competitive need limitations” that effectively serve as
quotas, cutting off preferential treatment when a beneficiary’s annual
exports of a product reach a predetermined level.54
The three main forms of differentiation—the provision of
additional preferences to regional groups of beneficiaries, the
withdrawal of preferences on the basis of certain criteria, and the
“graduation” of competitive countries—are prominent in the U.S.
scheme. This Part explores the mechanisms by which the U.S. GSP
implements each type of differentiation.
A. Regional Preferences
The U.S. GSP provides additional preferences to some recipients
primarily by means of three regional programs: the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI),55 the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA),56 and
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).57 All three
programs provide duty-free access for some products that are
58
excluded from the general GSP scheme. CBI, which is limited to
59
twenty-seven beneficiary countries, attempts to achieve a “stable

53. Id. § 2463(b)(1). In contrast, the EC scheme provides duty-free access to nonsensitive
imports and a reduction in tariff rates to some import-sensitive products. Council Regulation
2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 7.1–.2, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 3.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2). Competitive need limitations may be waived to further national
economic interests or to maintain “a historical preferential trade relationship” between the
United States and a beneficiary country. Id. § 2463(d). These limitations implement the a priori
limitations agreed to in the Agreed Conclusions. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 201–231, 97 Stat. 369,
384–98 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 33
U.S.C.).
56. Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, §§ 201–208, 105 Stat. 1233, 1236–44
(1991) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201–3206 (2000)).
57. African Growth and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, §§ 101–131, 114 Stat. 251,
252–75 (2000) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2466a, 3701–3741 (2000)). For criticism of
all three regional preference programs, see generally GARCIA, supra note 6, at 162–65.
58. See 19 U.S.C. § 2466a(b)(1) (authorizing duty-free access for products excluded under
the general GSP scheme so long as they are not import-sensitive when imported from subSaharan Africa); id. § 2703 (authorizing duty-free access for all Caribbean products other than
certain textiles, footwear, tuna, petroleum, watches, and leather goods); id. § 3203(b)(1)
(permitting duty-free access for, inter alia, footwear, petroleum, watches, and handbags from the
Andean countries).
59. Id. § 2702.
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60
political and economic climate in the Caribbean region.” ATPA’s
purpose is more narrow—to “creat[e] viable alternatives to illicit
61
trade in coca” —but, like CBI, its preferences are available to only a
select group of countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru.62
AGOA trade preferences, which aim to promote “stable and
sustainable economic growth and development in sub-Saharan
Africa,”63 are available to forty-eight African countries.64 The United
States obtained waivers of its GATT obligations for the CBI65 and
66
67
ATPA programs, but the waiver for ATPA expired in 2001. No
68
waiver has been approved for AGOA.
In addition, the United States favors the least-developed
countries, which receive duty-free access for an additional 1770
69
articles excluded under the general scheme and are exempt from
70
competitive need limitations. The Enabling Clause permits such
special treatment for the least-developed countries.71

60. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382,
§ 202, 104 Stat. 655, 655 (1990).
61. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 3102, 116
Stat. 1023, 1023 (2002).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 3202(b)(1).
63. Id. § 3701(a).
64. Id. § 3706.
65. WTO, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act—Renewal of Waiver, WT/L/104
(Nov. 24, 1995), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/104.WPF.
66. WTO, United States-Andean Trade Preference Act—Decision of 14 October 1996,
WT/L/184 (Oct. 14, 1996), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/
WT/L/184.WPF.
67. See id. para. 1 (extending the waiver until December 4, 2001).
68. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, annex E (listing all waivers that the WTO
had approved before the EC-India Panel ruling), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246R-05.doc.
69. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK 1 (1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/asset_upload_file333_5430.pdf; see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 2463(a)(l)(B) (authorizing duty-free access for products from least-developed countries that
are ineligible for such treatment under the general scheme).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)(D).
71. See Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(d) (permitting “[s]pecial treatment of the
least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific
measures in favour of developing countries”).
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B. Conditionality
72
All GSP schemes condition preferences to some degree in the
form of either “positive” or “negative” conditionality. Positive
conditionality is the practice of granting additional concessions to
73
developing countries that fulfill prescribed criteria; positive
conditionality affects preferences offered to countries that are already
GSP beneficiaries. For instance, the EC provides additional
reductions in GSP tariffs to countries that take prescribed legislative
steps to protect fundamental labor rights.74 In contrast, negative
conditionality—more commonly used in GSP schemes—denotes the
withdrawal of concessions from countries that fail to comply with
prescribed criteria, or the refusal to grant concessions to such
countries from the outset.75 As such, negative conditionality affects
the designation of beneficiary status.
76
The U.S. GSP, which has received the most ardent criticism,
primarily employs negative conditionality; instead of granting
additional preferences to specific developing countries, it withdraws
GSP preferences from countries that do not meet certain conditions.
Some conditions trigger mandatory withdrawal or denial of GSP
benefits,77 whereas others are discretionary factors for consideration
in determining beneficiary status.78 The conditions generally fall into
three overarching categories: (1) political conditions, (2) human rights
conditions, and (3) conditions related to U.S. economic interests.

72. See Howse, supra note 10, at 1359 (“All GSP schemes contain elements of selectivity
and conditionality . . . .”).
73. Diego J. Linan Nogueras & Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human Rights Conditionality
in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 307, 309 (2001).
74. Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, arts. 8.1(a), 14–20, 2001 O.J. (L 346)
at 4, 6–7.
75. See Linan Nogueras & Hinojosa Martinez, supra note 73, at 309 (analyzing human
rights conditionality in EC trade practice); see, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(A) (prohibiting U.S.
GSP preferences for some Communist countries); Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11,
art. 26.1(c), 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 9 (allowing the temporary withdrawal of preferences from
countries that fail to protect certain labor standards).
76. See MCMAHON, supra note 47, at 142 (“The most controversial approach to beneficiary
selection has been taken by the United States.”); see, e.g., ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6
(criticizing the U.S. GSP).
77. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2) (“The President shall not designate any country a
beneficiary developing country . . . if any of the following applies . . . .”).
78. See id. § 2462(c) (“In determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary
developing country . . . the President shall take into account . . . .”).
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Political conditions prohibit granting GSP treatment to countries
79
80
that are Communist, belong to a commodity cartel, or aid terrorists
81
or fail to support U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The human rights
conditions exclusively concern labor standards; countries that fail to
afford internationally recognized worker rights or to eliminate the
worst forms of child labor are ineligible for GSP benefits.82
“Internationally recognized worker rights” include the right of
association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, the
prohibition of forced labor, a minimum age for the employment of
children, and the maintenance of acceptable work conditions.83 The
International Labor Organization (ILO) has recognized all but the
84
maintenance of acceptable work conditions as “fundamental.”
A country’s failure to protect the economic interests of U.S.
exporters or investors may trigger mandatory or discretionary
withdrawal of GSP benefits. For example, countries that provide
preferential access to products of another developed country are
85
ineligible for GSP treatment. Additionally, GSP treatment may be
withdrawn on a discretionary basis because of unfair export
practices,86 the existence of trade-distorting investment measures,87 or
88
failure to protect intellectual property rights. Countries are ineligible
for preferential access if they nationalize property owned by U.S.
citizens or entities without providing “prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation,”89 or if they fail to recognize or enforce
arbitral awards favoring U.S. citizens or entities.90

79. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(A).
80. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(B).
81. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(F).
82. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(G)–(H).
83. Id. § 2467(4).
84. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Sess., para. 2
(June 18, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237 (1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
85. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(C).
86. Id. § 2462(c)(4).
87. Id. § 2462(c)(6).
88. Id. § 2462(c)(5).
89. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(D).
90. Id. § 2462(b)(2)(E).
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C. Graduation
For purposes of GSP schemes, a country’s status as “developing”
91
is generally governed by the principle of self-election. However, the
U.S. GSP mandates the “graduation” of countries that have reached a
92
certain level of development on the theory that such countries no
longer need preferential treatment to compete in developed
markets.93 The United States measures a country’s level of
94
development primarily by reference to World Bank calculations,
95
although it may also consider certain discretionary factors.
III. THE APPELLATE BODY REPORT: THE MEANING OF
“NON-DISCRIMINATORY”
Despite longstanding dissatisfaction with aspects of many GSP
schemes, until 2002 developing countries had refrained from
96
The landscape changed
challenging the schemes’ validity.
dramatically when India requested the establishment of a panel to
97
review the EC’s GSP system. Before the WTO Dispute Settlement

91. See Onyejekwe, supra note 24, at 457 (noting developed-country agreement to the
principle of self-election).
92. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (“graduating” countries that the World Bank has designated as
“high-income” countries). By 2002, thirty-six countries had been graduated from the U.S. GSP.
ÖZDEN & REINHARDT, supra note 6, at 5. The EC GSP, which graduates countries that have
met certain requirements for three consecutive years, is another example of a mandatory
graduation scheme. See Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at
2–3.
93. See MCMAHON, supra note 47, at 129–30 (explaining that developed countries have
read the Enabling Clause to permit the graduation of successful GSP beneficiaries).
94. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e).
95. See id. § 2462(c) (allowing consideration of factors such as a country’s desire to
participate, a country’s level of economic development, and a country’s participation in other
GSP schemes).
96. Bagwell et al., supra note 9, at 71.
97. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European Communities—
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/4 (Dec.
9, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/246-4.doc; see also
Request for Consultations by India, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/l (Mar. l2, 2002) [hereinafter Request
for Consultations by India], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/G/L/521.doc. India initially challenged not only the Drug Arrangements but also the special
incentive arrangements for labor and the environment. See Request for Consultations by India,
supra, paras. 1–2. India later limited its arguments to the Drug Arrangements. EC—GSP Panel
Report, supra note 26, para. 1.5. Brazil had previously requested consultations concerning the
EC’s GSP program but did not subsequently request the establishment of a panel. See Request
for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities—Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee,
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98
Body, India challenged the legitimacy of the EC’s Drug
Arrangements, through which twelve countries qualified for duty-free
access on products for which other GSP beneficiaries, such as India,
received only tariff reductions.99 A WTO Panel ruled in favor of India
on December 1, 2003, proclaiming that virtually no differentiation of
100
any kind was permissible under the Enabling Clause. On April 7,
2004, the WTO Appellate Body affirmed the Panel’s ruling that the
Drug Arrangements were invalid but modified much of the Panel’s
legal analysis,101 leaving open the possibility that the Enabling Clause
permits some differentiation.102
The Appellate Body expressly limited its analysis to the question
of whether a donor country may discriminate among developing
103
countries that are already beneficiaries under its GSP, declining to
examine whether donor states can employ conditionality to exclude
some developing countries entirely or graduate countries from their
GSP schemes.104 Nonetheless, its ruling sheds light on how it might
approach such questions in the future. This Part briefly summarizes
the EC-India dispute, the Panel’s ruling, and, most importantly, the

WT/DS209/1 (Oct. 19, 2000), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/G/L/399.doc.
98. The Dispute Settlement Body administers the dispute settlement process in the WTO.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. 2, WTO Agreement, Annex 2. Parties with complaints as to another party’s WTO
obligations may request the establishment of a panel composed of three “well-qualified
governmental and/or non-governmental individuals.” Id. arts. 6, 8. Appeals may be brought to
the Appellate Body, a standing body of seven individuals, three of whom serve on any given
case. Id. art. 17. Appellate Body reports are automatically adopted by the Dispute Settlement
Body unless there is a consensus not to adopt a report. Id.
99. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 4.38 (arguing that the Drug
Arrangements rendered Indian textile exporters less competitive than their Pakistani
counterparts receiving the additional preferences); see also Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra
note 11, arts. 10, 25, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 5, 8 (authorizing duty-free access for exports from
twelve countries that otherwise would qualify for a simple tariff reduction under the general
GSP scheme). The EC had requested a waiver for the Drug Arrangements, but no action had
been taken on the waiver request. See Request for a Waiver, New EC Special Tariff
Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking, G/C/W/328 (Oct. 24, 2001)
(requesting a waiver from Article I), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/G/C/W328.doc.
100. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, paras. 7.176–.177 (noting that the Enabling
Clause permits only two types of differentiation—a priori limitations and special treatment of
the least-developed countries).
101. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 190.
102. See id. paras. 142–67 (explaining the meaning of “non-discriminatory”).
103. Id. para. 128.
104. See id.
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Appellate Body’s ruling. Part IV then analyzes the ruling’s broader
ramifications for the U.S. GSP.
A. Basis for the Dispute: The EC’s Drug Arrangements
Under its GSP program, the EC provides duty-free access for
nonsensitive products and reduced tariff rates for sensitive products
105
from all GSP recipients. It operates, however, three incentive
arrangements that further reduce or eliminate tariffs on some
sensitive products for certain countries—a form of positive
conditionality.106 The special incentive arrangements for protection of
labor rights and the environment are available to all beneficiaries
demonstrating adherence to international labor standards or
international standards concerning sustainable management of
107
tropical forests. The preferences under the incentive arrangement to
combat drug production and trafficking—the subject of the EC-India
dispute—are limited by regulation to only twelve countries.108
Motivating India’s challenge were the more beneficial tariff
preferences that Pakistani exporters were receiving under the Drug
Arrangements.109 Before the Panel and Appellate Body, India argued
that the Drug Arrangements violated the EC’s MFN obligation110 and

105. Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 7.1–.2, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 3.
106. For a discussion of positive conditionality, see supra note 73 and accompanying text. In
July 2004, the European Commission proposed a simplified GSP program combining the three
incentive arrangements into a unified “GSP+” program, which would provide incentives to
“countries that accept the main international conventions on social rights, environmental
protection and governance, including the fight against drugs production and trafficking.”
Press Release, European Commission, Developing Countries: Commission Unveils System of
Trade
Preferences
for
Next
Ten
Years
(July
7,
2004),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/860&format=HTML&aged
=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also Developing Countries, International Trade and
Sustainable Development: The Function of the Community’s Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) for the Ten-Year Period from 2006 to 2015, COM(2004) 461 final at 8, 9–10
(proposing the same system). The new GSP scheme would take effect in 2006.
107. Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, arts. 8, 14, 21, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 4, 6, 7.
108. Id. art. 10, annex I, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 5, 13–18. The twelve countries are Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Id. annex I, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 13–18.
109. See EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 4.38 (“[I]n the case of the tariff
preferences accorded to textiles and clothing products from Pakistan, the true ‘donor’ countries
are India and other developing countries that compete directly with Pakistan’s exports to the
European Communities.”).
110. Id. paras. 4.8–.14.
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111

were not justified by the Enabling Clause. India read footnote three
of the Enabling Clause, which refers to “the establishment of
‘generalized, non-reciprocal, and non-discriminatory preferences
beneficial to the developing countries’”112 in the 1971 waiver, to
impose binding requirements on GSP donors, and it interpreted
“non-discriminatory” to require that all developing-country
beneficiaries receive the same preferences.113 According to India,
paragraph 2(a), by describing preferences “beneficial to the
developing countries,” confirms that donors must provide the same
treatment to all developing countries.114
In response, the EC asserted that the reference to “nondiscriminatory” in footnote three of the Enabling Clause does not
require developed countries to provide identical tariff treatment to all
115
Instead, it argued, developed countries may
beneficiaries.
differentiate among “developing countries which, according to
objective criteria, have different development needs.”116 Hence, the
EC contended, the Drug Arrangements were justifiable under the
Enabling Clause because they were based on “an overall assessment
of the gravity of the drug problem in each developing country made
117
in accordance with objective, non-discriminatory criteria.”
B. The Panel Ruling
The Panel not only found the Drug Arrangements discriminatory
and, hence, invalid but also condemned virtually any and all
differentiation in GSP schemes, obliterating developed countries’
assumptions about their ability to condition GSP benefits. As a
threshold matter, the Panel concluded that the Enabling Clause is an

111. Id. paras. 4.31–.41. India argued that the Enabling Clause should be construed as an
exception to Article I:1. Id. paras. 4.27–.28.
112. Id. para. 4.31 (quoting Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3).
113. Id. para. 4.33.
114. Id. para. 4.35.
115. Id. para. 4.47. Before raising its Enabling Clause arguments, the EC first argued that
the Enabling Clause is not an exception to Article I:1 but rather an “autonomous and
permanent right.” Id. para. 4.42.
116. Id.
117. Id. para. 4.75. The EC also asserted as a defense GATT Article XX, arguing that the
Drug Arrangements were “necessary for the protection of human life or health.” Id. para. 4.91.
The EC did not appeal the Panel’s ruling on this issue. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report,
supra note 3, para. 78 (listing the issues that the EC appealed). Further discussion of this
defense is outside the scope of this Note.
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118
exception to Article I:1, as India had argued. Consequently, the
Panel held that the EC bore the burden of asserting the Enabling
Clause as a defense and of proving the Arrangements’ compatibility
with the Clause.119
Because the Drug Arrangements were “accorded only on the
condition that the receiving countries [were] experiencing a certain
gravity of drug problems,” the Panel found that they were not
120
“unconditional” as required by Article I:1, which the Panel
interpreted as meaning that tariffs must “not [be] limited by or
subject to any conditions.”121 For this reason, the Panel proceeded to
analyze the EC’s affirmative Enabling Clause defense.
The Panel first focused its Enabling Clause analysis on paragraph
122
2(a) and footnote three to that paragraph, which together authorize
preferential tariff treatment as described in the 1971 waiver. It also
considered paragraph 3(c),123 which mandates that GSP schemes
124
“respond positively to the needs of developing countries.” Finding
the text of these provisions vague, the Panel turned to the Agreed
Conclusions, which it regarded as “preparatory work” for the
Enabling Clause.125
According to the Panel, the Agreed Conclusions reflected a
comprehensive understanding that all developing countries were to
126
receive preferential treatment on an equal basis. Because the
parties to the Conclusions had envisioned only two types of
differentiation—a priori limitations and preferential treatment for the

118. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, paras. 7.35–.39; see supra note 111
(summarizing India’s argument).
119. See id. para. 7.42 (requiring the EC to invoke the Enabling Clause as an affirmative
defense and placing the burden of proof under the Enabling Clause on the EC).
120. Id. para. 7.60.
121. Id. para. 7.59. The Panel grounded this assertion on the ordinary meaning of the word
“unconditional.” Id.
122. See id. para. 7.65 (“The main issue disputed by the parties is whether the Drug
Arrangements are consistent with Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, particularly the
requirement of ‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 to this subparagraph.”).
123. Id.
124. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 3(c).
125. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, paras. 7.78–.86; cf. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(2)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise . . . any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty . . . .”).
126. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.144.
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127
least-developed countries —the Enabling Clause permitted no other
128
differentiation. Similarly, because the parties had agreed to “the
levels of product coverage and depth of tariff cuts,” the Panel
declared that “GSP schemes providing for lesser product coverage or
depth of tariff cuts” would be illegitimate, even though this issue was
129
not before the Panel. In light of its conclusion that GSP schemes
must consider the needs of every developing country without
differentiation,130 the Panel declared the Drug Arrangements
131
invalid.

C. The Appellate Body Ruling
Although the Appellate Body also found for India, ruling that
the Drug Arrangements violated Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause,
it reined in the Panel’s broad condemnation of virtually all
differentiation in GSP schemes.132 Significantly, it left open the
possibility that other forms of positive conditionality—if based on
objective criteria—might be legitimate.
Like the Panel, the Appellate Body commenced its analysis by
examining the relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling
Clause. It, too, ruled that, because the Enabling Clause permits
“differential and more favourable treatment” notwithstanding Article
I:1, the Clause constitutes an exception to Article I:l’s MFN
127. See id. paras. 7.106–.115 (recognizing the validity of a priori limitations and special
treatment for the least-developed countries).
128. Id. para. 7.116. In its discussion of the meaning of nondiscrimination, the Panel made
broad findings on issues not implicated in the dispute. For example, it found that, for a
developed country to comply with paragraph 3(c)’s requirement that it respond to the needs of
developing countries, it would have to provide a “level of product coverage and depth of tariff
cuts in general . . . no less than the level and depth offered and accepted in the Agreed
Conclusions.” Id. The Appellate Body later recognized that the Panel “implicitly made findings
on issues that were not before it.” EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 128.
129. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.95. Developed countries must have
found this conclusion especially startling, given that the parties to the Agreed Conclusions
recognized the nonbinding nature of GSP schemes. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
130. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.105.
131. Id. para. 7.177.
132. Consequently, the EC welcomed the Appellate Body Report, despite technically losing
the dispute. See Press Release, European Commission, WTO India—GSP: WTO Confirms
Differentiation Among Developing Countries Is Possible (Apr. 7, 2004) (“[The] decision makes
it clear that we can continue, to give trade preferences to developing countries according to
their particular situation and needs, provided this is done in an objective, non-discriminatory
and transparent manner.” (quoting EC Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy)), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/476&format=HTML&aged
=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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133
requirement. In clarifying the relationship between Article I:1 and
the Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body put forth a succinct test for
the legitimacy of a provision allegedly taken under the Enabling
Clause. First, “a dispute settlement panel should . . . examine the
consistency of a challenged measure with Article I:1.”134 Only if the
measure is inconsistent with Article I:1 is it necessary to consider
135
whether the Enabling Clause justifies the measure. In this case,
however, the Appellate Body proceeded directly to the second step of
this test because the EC had not appealed the Panel’s ruling that the
Drug Arrangements violated Article I:1.136
The Appellate Body’s analysis of the Drug Arrangement’s
conformity with the Enabling Clause turned on the nature of footnote
137
three —referring to the “generalized, non-reciprocal and non138
discriminatory preferences” described in the 1971 waiver —and the
139
meaning of “non-discriminatory” therein. The Appellate Body
ruled, over the objections of the EC, that footnote three, through its
reference to the 1971 waiver, “imposes obligations that must be
fulfilled for preferential tariff treatment to be justified under
paragraph 2(a).”140 It grounded this conclusion on the French and
Spanish versions of the Enabling Clause, which permit preferential
tariff treatment “in accordance” with the GSP “as defined” in the
1971 waiver.141 The French and Spanish versions, the Appellate Body
142
found, confirm that footnote three imposes “obligatory” conditions.

133. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 90. The Appellate Body noted,
however, that the Enabling Clause “encourage[s] [WTO members] to deviate from Article I,”
suggesting “special status . . . in the WTO system.” Id. paras. 110–11 (emphasis omitted).
Consequently, the Appellate Body ruled that India was responsible for initially alleging
inconsistency with the Enabling Clause, even if the ultimate burden of proof rested with the EC.
Id. para. 118. This author is unaware of any other exceptions for which a complaining party
bears the burden of alleging inconsistency with an exception. India had alleged inconsistency
with the Enabling Clause in its written submissions and had therefore fulfilled this requirement.
Id. para. 122.
134. Id. para. 101.
135. Id.
136. See id. para. 78 (listing the issues that the EC appealed).
137. See id. paras. 129–31 (explaining that India’s claim was “limited to the consistency of
the Drug Arrangements with . . . footnote 3”).
138. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3.
139. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 131.
140. Id. para. 148 (emphasis added).
141. Id. para. 147. For a brief exposition of scholarly debate on whether footnote three
imposes binding obligations, see supra note 40.
142. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 147.
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Having concluded that footnote three requires that GSP
preferences be “non-discriminatory,” the Appellate Body considered
the meaning of this term. Here, the Appellate Body disagreed with
the Panel’s interpretation, ruling that the nondiscrimination
requirement does not prohibit “treating different developing-country
143
In so ruling, the Appellate Body
beneficiaries differently.”
concurred144 with the EC’s interpretation of “non-discriminatory” as
permitting differentiation “between developing countries which have
145
different development needs.” It premised this ruling on three
considerations.
First, the Appellate Body consulted footnote three’s reference to
“generalized” preferences as context for interpreting “nondiscriminatory,” observing that the term “generalized” requires that
146
GSP schemes be “generally applicable.” It noted that, in the context
of the initial GSP negotiations, the “generalized” requirement was
designed “to eliminate existing ‘special’ preferences that were granted
only to certain designated developing countries.”147 Finding that the
“generalized” requirement sufficed to prevent the reinstatement of
such special preferences, the Appellate Body inferred that a
nondiscrimination requirement encompassing identical tariffs to all
participants would provide little additional value.148
Second, and most importantly, the Appellate Body relied on
paragraph 3(c), which provides that GSP treatment “shall . . . be
designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the
149
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.”
This provision suggests an obligation to respond positively to such
needs,150 which, as the Appellate Body observed, may vary from
151
country to country and over time. The Appellate Body qualified this

143. Id. para. 162. Recall that the Panel had held that the same preferences must be
provided to all developing countries. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
144. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 162 (authorizing
differentiation among developing-country beneficiaries).
145. Id. para. 149.
146. Id. para. 156.
147. Id. para. 155.
148. See id. para. 156 (criticizing the Panel’s conclusion that allowing differentiation would
“result [in] the collapse of the whole GSP system” (alteration in original) (quoting EC—GSP
Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.102)).
149. Id. para. 157 (quoting Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 3(c)).
150. Id. para. 158.
151. Id. para. 160.
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finding in two respects. First, the existence of “development, financial
[or] trade needs” must be based on “objective standards,” such as
152
needs laid out in multilateral instruments. Second, a GSP response
to such needs must be “positive,” that is, “consisting in or
characterized by constructive action or attitudes.”153
Finally, the Appellate Body found support for its conclusion in
the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, which provides that
there is “need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries . . . secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”154
According to the Appellate Body, this language bolsters the
155
conclusion that development needs may vary across countries.
Although the Appellate Body concluded that the Enabling
Clause permits “the possibility of additional preferences for
156
developing countries with particular needs,” it ultimately deemed
157
the EC’s Drug Arrangements invalid. The ruling suggested that
“the problem of illicit drug production and trafficking” might
constitute a development need;158 in this case, however, the Appellate
Body found that the Drug Arrangements provided no “objective
criteria” by which countries with similar drug problems could qualify
for the preferences.159 Consequently, the EC failed to demonstrate
that the Drug Arrangements were nondiscriminatory.
IV. ARE U.S. GSP PREFERENCES “GENERALIZED, NONRECIPROCAL AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY”?
The Appellate Body ruling, though binding only as to the EC’s
Drug Arrangements, holds serious ramifications for the U.S. GSP.
The most fundamental ramification is clear: the preferences provided
under the U.S. GSP must be “generalized, non-reciprocal, and nondiscriminatory.”160 The exact meaning of these requirements,
152. Id. para. 163.
153. Id. para. 164.
154. Id. para. 168 (quoting WTO Agreement pmbl.).
155. Id. para. 169.
156. Id.
157. Id. para. 189.
158. Id. para 180; see id. (asserting that the Drug Arrangements would be valid only if the
preferences were provided to “all GSP beneficiaries . . . similarly affected by the drug
problem”).
159. Id. para. 183.
160. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3.
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however, is vague. The Appellate Body’s ruling turned solely on the
meaning of “non-discriminatory,” and, because the EC’s Drug
Arrangements were obviously subjective in nature, the Appellate
Body did not explore in detail what sorts of objective criteria would
render preferences nondiscriminatory. Nonetheless, the ruling
provides a starting point for interpreting these requirements and
suggests that some parts of the U.S. GSP are probably illegitimate.
This Part proffers a framework for analyzing consequences of the
footnote three requirements for the key assumptions underlying the
U.S. GSP. It first considers the requirement most thoroughly
examined by the Appellate Body—nondiscrimination—and
demonstrates that the U.S. regional GSP schemes are likely
illegitimate absent waivers. It then considers the murkier question of
whether the United States may condition beneficiary status, analyzing
such conditions under both Article I:1 and the “generalized”
requirement of the Enabling Clause. Here, this Part suggests that
conditionality based on objective criteria to which developing
countries have agreed in another context is likely valid. Finally, it
demonstrates that the U.S. graduation mechanism would probably
pass scrutiny under the Appellate Body’s analysis.
A. Discrimination: The Likely Illegitimacy of the Regional GSP
Schemes
The Appellate Body helpfully distinguished between
differentiation among countries that are beneficiaries of a GSP
161
scheme and complete denial of GSP beneficiary status. The
Appellate Body’s analysis applies only to differentiation among
beneficiary countries. In the context of the U.S. GSP, such
differentiation occurs almost exclusively by means of the regional
GSP schemes: the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Andean
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA).162
The regional schemes, which are similar to the EC’s Drug
Arrangements in that they provide extra preferences to select groups

161. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
162. For an explanation of the regional schemes, see supra Part II.A. Of course, the U.S.
scheme also distinguishes between developing-country and least-developed country
beneficiaries, but this distinction is explicitly authorized in the Enabling Clause and is not
discussed further in this Note. See Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(d) (authorizing
special treatment for the least-developed countries); supra Part II.A.
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of countries, likely fail the nondiscrimination requirement. Regional
preference schemes are not per se invalid under the Appellate Body’s
analysis: if a region has an objective development need unique to that
region, GSP schemes presumably can differentiate to take account of
that need. In the U.S. scheme, however, there are no objective
criteria, other than geographic ones, for selecting beneficiary
countries; all three schemes are limited by statute to a closed universe
of beneficiaries.163
The regional schemes reveal the importance of responding to a
widely recognized, “particular” development, financial, or trade
need.164 ATPA arguably responds to a particular need—the
elimination of drug production—although it lacks criteria by which to
identify countries experiencing this need.165 In contrast, the goals of
CBI and AGOA—economic development and stability—are not
particular because they merely reflect the underlying goals of the
GSP system in general. Given that all GSP beneficiaries are
underdeveloped, it would be impossible for the United States to
devise objective criteria based on “general” development needs that
would differentiate CBI and AGAO recipients from others.166 Thus,
for a regional GSP scheme to pass scrutiny under the Enabling
Clause, it must respond to a particular need and must identify
countries based on objective criteria. Because the U.S. schemes fail
167
this test, they are discriminatory and require waivers.
B. Conditionality: The Possible Legitimacy of “Mutually Acceptable”
Conditions
The more daunting question is to what extent the United States
may refuse to grant beneficiary status to countries that do not comply
with certain conditions. The ramifications of the Appellate Body’s

163. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 183 (criticizing the Drug
Arrangements for failing to specify criteria that would allow other “similarly affected”
developing countries to qualify for the additional preferences); supra notes 59, 62, 64 and
accompanying text.
164. See EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163 (noting that “[b]roadbased recognition of a particular need” could constitute an objective criterion).
165. See supra notes 61, 156 and accompanying text.
166. To clarify, the problem is that the United States provides additional benefits to some
regional groupings, not that regional groupings exist per se. Presumably, if the United States
provided the same benefits to all similarly situated GSP beneficiaries but did so through
regional GSP schemes, this approach would not be discriminatory.
167. There is a waiver in effect for CBI. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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ruling for this type of negative conditionality are much less clear. The
legitimacy of U.S. conditionality depends on several factors, some of
which the Appellate Body did not discuss in its analysis limited to the
nondiscrimination requirement. First, the condition must be analyzed
in the context of Article I:1 because if it does not violate Article I:1
there is no need to resort to the Enabling Clause for justification.
Second, if the condition is invalid under Article I:1, its consistency
with the Enabling Clause’s “generalized” requirement must be
examined. This second step entails analysis of what constitutes
168
“development, financial and trade needs” beyond the analysis that
the Appellate Body provided. Finally, it is possible that some other
WTO provision or international instrument might validate the
condition.
1. The Meaning of “Unconditionally” under Article I:1. In
describing the rule-exception relationship between the Enabling
Clause and Article I:1, the Appellate Body put forward a threshold
inquiry:
[A] dispute settlement panel should, as a first step, examine the
consistency of a challenged measure with Article I:1, as the general
rule. If the measure is considered at this stage to be inconsistent with
Article I:1, the panel should then examine, as a second step, whether
169
the measure is nevertheless justified by the Enabling Clause.

In other words, if the challenged measure is consistent with Article
I:1, there is no need to examine it under the Enabling Clause.
The MFN Clause of Article I:1 requires that “any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country . . . be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
170
parties.” The Appellate Body did not define “unconditionally”
because the EC had not appealed the Panel’s ruling that the Drug
Arrangements violated the MFN obligation of Article I:1.171 The
Panel had defined “unconditionally” as “not limited by or subject to

168. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163 (quoting Enabling Clause,
supra note 21, para. 3(c)).
169. Id. para. 101.
170. GATT art. I:1 (emphasis added).
171. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 124 n.259.
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172
any conditions,” which presumably would render any condition
imposed on the granting of a tariff preference per se invalid.173
The Appellate Body has yet to clarify the scope of Article I:1’s
“unconditionally” requirement. In Canada—Autos,174 the Appellate
Body ruled that Article I:1 prohibits both de jure and de facto
175
discrimination. Thus, an origin-neutral condition (one that is not de
jure discriminatory), such as the measure in Canada—Autos,176
177
violates Article I:1 if it results in de facto discrimination. Indeed, the
Appellate Body stated that the purpose of Article I:1 is “to prohibit
discrimination among like products originating in or destined for
different countries,”178 emphasizing that an advantage granted to one
member must be granted to “all other Members.”179
Virtually all conditions in the U.S. GSP scheme are originneutral: that is, the conditions, such as those conditioning GSP
benefits on compliance with labor standards, apply to all potential
beneficiaries. Consequently, the conditions violate Article I:1 only if
they are de facto discriminatory. Canada—Autos suggests that
conditionality in GSP schemes would constitute de facto
discrimination, because those countries failing to meet a given
condition would not receive the advantage. However, the precise

172. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 7.59.
173. See WorldTradeLaw.net, Dispute Settlement Commentary (DSC): Panel Report,
European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries 20, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/panel/ec-preferences(dsc)(panel).pdf (last
visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (observing that the Panel’s “broad”
interpretation apparently makes all conditions invalid).
174. WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, WT/DS139, 142/AB/R, para. 78 (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter Canada—
Autos Appellate Body Report], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/
WT/DS/139ABR.doc.
175. Id.
176. In Canada—Autos, Canada provided import duty exemptions to manufacturers that
had established a certain level of production in Canada. Id. paras. 7–9. The list of manufacturers
eligible for this exemption was closed in 1998. Id. para. 9. The effect of the measure was to
extend the exemption to a small group of mostly American manufacturers and their related
companies. See id. para. 71 (listing General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and Volvo as the sole
beneficiaries of the import duty exemptions).
177. Id. para. 78.
178. Id. para. 84 (emphasis added); see also Davey & Pauwelyn, supra note 40, at 41
(proposing a de facto discrimination test on the basis of the “object and purpose of” Article I:1).
One observer suggests that the plain text of Article I:1 might support such an interpretation of
“unconditionally,” arguing that “‘unconditionally’ could be viewed as part of the nondiscrimination requirement.” WorldTradeLaw.net, supra note 173, at 21.
179. Canada—Autos Appellate Body Report, supra note 174, para. 79.
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180
meaning of de facto discrimination remains unclear. In Canada—
Autos, it was virtually impossible for all exporters to comply with the
181
origin-neutral condition in question. Thus, the condition was bound
to result in de facto discrimination, even though it was not facially
discriminatory. Developed countries might argue that a measure is
not de facto discriminatory if it merely imposes conditions that all
countries are equally capable of fulfilling or are even required to
fulfill.182 For instance, the United States might contend that
conditioning GSP beneficiary status on fundamental labor standards
183
recognized by the ILO is not discriminatory because all WTO
members have committed themselves to these fundamental
184
standards.
Hence, developed countries might argue that the crux of the de
facto discriminatory inquiry should be whether all countries are
equally situated to comply with a provision. The factual limitations of
Canada—Autos—the complete inability of some manufacturers to
comply with the origin-neutral condition—make it difficult to
anticipate the Appellate Body’s response to this argument. Given the
185
strict language of Canada—Autos, it is questionable whether the
Appellate Body would agree with this analysis. If the Appellate Body
did not agree, a developed country would have to justify
conditionality in GSP schemes exclusively under the Enabling Clause.

180. See Lother Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and MostFavoured-Nation Treatment—Or Equal Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921, 922 (2002)
(“What exactly amounts to an illegal de facto discrimination . . . is unclear and the topic of
intense debate.”).
181. See supra note 176.
182. As one scholar puts the question, “In the event that some imports from one Member
enjoy an advantage under objective, origin-neutral conditions, can another Member always
claim this advantage for its like exports which do not meet these objective conditions?” Ehring,
supra note 180, at 930.
183. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
184. See Bartels, supra note 34, at 524–26 (arguing that a measure imposing standards
cannot be de facto discriminatory if all countries are bound to such standards, as in the case of
the ILO fundamental principles); see also WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 4 (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration] (“We renew
our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards.”),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm; Howse, supra
note 10, at 1357 (noting that all WTO members are “indirectly” committed to the ILO
fundamental labor standards through the Singapore Declaration).
185. See, e.g., Canada—Autos Appellate Body Report, supra note 174, para. 79 (“The words
of Article I:1 refer not to . . . like products from some other Members, but to like products
originating in or destined for ‘all other’ Members.”).
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2. “Generalized.” In the event that a GSP condition is deemed
invalid under Article I:1, the developed country nonetheless can
attempt to justify it under the Enabling Clause. Here, as indicated by
the Appellate Body, the relevant question is the meaning of
“generalized” in footnote three; the Appellate Body found that “the
term ‘generalized’ requires that the GSP schemes of preference186
granting countries remain generally applicable.” As such, the term
manifests the negotiating parties’ intent “to eliminate existing
‘special’ preferences that were granted only to certain designated
developing countries.”187 This interpretation of “generalized”
comports with the negotiating history in UNCTAD II, in that the
Agreed Conclusions explicitly noted that donor countries would “in
general” choose beneficiaries on the principle of self-election.188
That preferences must be “generally applicable” does not
necessarily preclude donors from imposing conditions on the receipt
of such preferences. To understand the precise nature of this
requirement, one must look to the rest of the Enabling Clause—
especially paragraph 3(c)—for context, just as the Appellate Body did
189
in interpreting “non-discriminatory.” The Appellate Body found
that paragraph 3(c) authorizes, and indeed requires, developed
countries to “respond positively” to “development, financial and
trade needs” assessed according to “an objective standard.”190 Two
inquiries arise from this conclusion: one, “What is a positive
response?” and, two, “What are objective standards?”
The most obvious problem with the U.S. scheme of
conditionality under the Appellate Body’s analysis is that it might not
constitute a positive response. Unlike the EC GSP, which offers the
prospect of additional preferences as an incentive, the U.S. GSP
removes preferences in the event that a developing country fails to
meet certain conditions. The Appellate Body defined “positively” as
191
“consisting in or characterized by constructive action or attitudes.”
According to the Appellate Body, this suggests that actions such as
conditionality must aim at “improving the development, financial or
186. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 156.
187. Id. para. 155.
188. Agreed Conclusions, supra note 29, para. IV.1; see also supra note 31 (explaining the
principle of self-election).
189. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 130.
190. Id. paras. 162–63.
191. Id. para. 164 (quoting 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2293 (W.R.
Trumble & A. Stevenson eds., 5th ed. 2002)).
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trade situation of a beneficiary country,” and that the need in
question must be one that “can be effectively addressed through tariff
192
Given that the Drug Arrangements constituted
preferences.”
positive conditionality, the Appellate Body did not consider whether
negative schemes such as the U.S. GSP could constitute a positive
response.
Because the Appellate Body’s analysis with respect to this point
is underdeveloped, it is impossible to predict whether the United
States would survive a challenge on this ground. Nevertheless, there
are plausible arguments that the United States might make in its
defense. The United States could argue that, in threatening to revoke
GSP preferences in response to certain conditions, its goal is, in
effect, to improve the development situation of developing countries.
It might point to the pervasiveness of negative conditionality in GSP
schemes as evidence of consensus that negative conditions are
effective in fueling improvements in developing countries.193
Assuming that the United States successfully framed its negative
conditionality as a “positive” response, it also would have to
demonstrate that such conditions are based on objective criteria. The
Appellate Body suggested that “[b]road-based recognition of a
particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral
instruments adopted by international organizations” might constitute
such criteria.194 The Appellate Body suggested that “the problem of
illicit drug production” might constitute a development need,195 but it
had no occasion to interpret this requirement further because the
EC’s Drug Arrangements were clearly not based on objective
criteria.196
Understanding the objective-criteria requirement necessitates
further elaboration on what sorts of multilateral instruments reflect
broad-based recognition. Presumably, institutions to which nearly all
countries are parties—such as the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund, or the World Bank—are sufficiently international in
scope to qualify under the Appellate Body’s test. There is little in the

192. Id.
193. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that the subsequent practice
of parties to a treaty is relevant to the treaty’s meaning. Vienna Convention, supra note 125, art.
31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
194. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163.
195. Id. para. 180.
196. Id. paras. 181–83.
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Appellate Body’s analysis, however, to clarify what institutions
beyond these clear-cut examples might qualify. For instance, it is
arguably unfair to hold developing countries to standards adopted by
organizations such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), to which most developing countries are not
parties.
Footnote three of the Enabling Clause proves instrumental in
elucidating the objective-criteria requirement. The footnote requires
197
that GSP schemes be “[a]s described” in the 1971 waiver, which
describes preferences not only as “generalized, non-reciprocal, and
198
non-discriminatory” but also as “mutually acceptable.” Thus, it
appears that all elements of GSP schemes, including conditionality,
must be “mutually acceptable” to both developed and developing
countries. In the case of standards developed by international
organizations to which the objecting developing countries are not
parties, such as the OECD, conditions based on such standards would
not be “mutually acceptable” and should be invalid.
Importantly, the 1971 waiver refers to “mutually acceptable,” not
“mutually accepted,” preferences. Thus, developing countries need
not have explicitly agreed to a certain condition in the context of a
199
GSP scheme; the condition need only be acceptable—that is,
200
“capable or worthy of being accepted” by developing countries. The
United States might thus contend that, when developing countries
have agreed to comply with certain standards outside the GSP
context, the conditioning of GSP preferences on adherence to those
standards is “mutually acceptable” and would satisfy paragraph 3(c).
This reasoning might justify certain conditions in the U.S. GSP.
For example, the United States might justify its labor standards on
the grounds that developing countries have already committed

197. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 2(a) n.3.
198. 1971 Waiver, supra note 34, pmbl.
199. The developing countries did agree to one condition in the U.S. GSP in the Agreed
Conclusions—that preferences would not be extended to countries granting “reverse”
preferences to other developed countries. See Graham, supra note 22, at 519 (stating that the
modified U.S. submission to the Special Preferences Committee provided that preferences
would be withdrawn for countries imposing “reverse” preferences, unless those countries
assured the United States that they would phase out the reverse preferences); see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 2462(b)(2)(C) (2000) (codifying this condition). This condition would clearly be “mutually
acceptable” and should arguably be valid, notwithstanding that it does not “respond positively
to a development, financial [or] trade need.” EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3,
paras. 162–63.
200. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1996).
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themselves to fundamental labor standards, and that such conditions
201
are consequently “acceptable” to developing countries.
Conditioning GSP benefits on combating terrorism also might be
legitimate because there exist numerous treaties obligating states to
oppose terrorism.202 Likewise, the United States might plausibly argue
that conditioning GSP benefits on the provision of compensation for
203
is mutually acceptable
nationalized property of U.S. citizens
because all countries are committed to this standard under customary
204
international law. Finally, conditions based on the WTO Agreement
itself, such as conditions dealing with trade-distorting investment
measures205 or the failure to protect intellectual property rights,206
would seem valid under the Appellate Body’s analysis of objective
standards. In contrast, the United States would be unable to point to
international instruments requiring developing countries to support
207
U.S. efforts to combat terrorism or to refrain from Communist
208
forms of government; these conditions would thus fail the objectivecriteria test. Of course, this step of the analysis is dependent on a
finding that negative conditionality constitutes a positive response,
which, as this Note demonstrates, the Appellate Body Report did not
clarify.

201. For a discussion of these labor standards in the context of Article I:1, see supra notes
183–84 and accompanying text. See also WorldTradeLaw.net, Dispute Settlement Commentary
(DSC): Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries 13, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/ab/ecpreferences(dsc)(ab).pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(contending that the Appellate Body’s approach permits the imposition of “conditions [that]
have the potential to be fulfilled,” which include ILO labor standards).
202. For a list of such treaties, see U.S. Dep’t of State, International Conventions and Other
Treaties Relating to Terrorism, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/6093.htm (last visited
Mar. 6, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
203. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D).
204. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 475 (1991) (“[I]nternational
tribunals have repeatedly held that international law requires full compensation for
expropriations of foreign property.”). Along these lines, conditionality with respect to
enforcement of arbitral awards could be “mutually acceptable” if the developing country bound
itself to enforce such awards. See 19 U.S.C.§ 2462(b)(2)(E) (barring beneficiary status for
countries “fail[ing] to act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards
in favor of United States citizens”).
205. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(6).
206. Id. § 2462(c)(5).
207. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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3. Other Grounds for Justifying Conditionality. Although the
primary focus of this analysis is the legitimacy of conditionality under
Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause, it merits mention that developed
countries might have other instruments at their disposal to justify the
imposition of conditions on GSP benefits. First, other WTO
provisions might justify conditionality or discrimination in GSP
schemes. It is clear that developed countries could obtain waivers for
preferential schemes that would otherwise violate Article I:1 and the
209
In fact, with respect to the EC’s Drug
Enabling Clause.
Arrangements, the Panel noted that a waiver would bring the EC into
compliance with its GATT obligations.210 It is also possible—though
less certain—that a developed country could justify conditionality or
discrimination in a GSP scheme through other exceptions to Article
I:1. For example, the EC originally asserted as a defense GATT
Article XX, which permits deviations from Article I:1 to protect
human life or health.211 Neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body
discussed the extent to which Article XX could excuse GSP schemes
that were inconsistent with the Enabling Clause. If Article XX can
justify discriminating among all countries, however, it potentially
justifies discriminating among a subset of those countries (i.e.,
developing countries).
A second, more complicated possibility is that a separate legal
instrument negotiated outside the WTO framework could authorize
conditionality within the context of the GSP. Suppose, for instance,
that the United States concluded a trade agreement with a developing
country in which the developing country agreed that GSP preferences
would be revoked if it failed to adhere to certain criteria. Naturally,
the United States would argue that this agreement precluded the
developing country from challenging the legitimacy of such
conditionality within the WTO framework. The extent to which nonWTO law may be invoked successfully to defend a violation of a
212
WTO provision is unresolved. This Note does not examine the

209. See GATT art. XXV:5 (permitting GATT members to waive the GATT obligations of
member countries “in exceptional circumstances” by a two-thirds vote); see, e.g., Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act—Renewal of Waiver, supra note 65 (authorizing differential
treatment under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act until December 31, 2005).
210. EC—GSP Panel Report, supra note 26, para. 8.3.
211. Id. para. 4.91.
212. See Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on NonWorld Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 997,
997–98 (2003) (noting that, although Panels and the Appellate Body have often referred to non-
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issues underlying the debate but merely posits this as a potential basis
for justifying conditionality under the GSP.
C. Graduation: A Legitimate Response to “Development Needs”
Although the Appellate Body explicitly noted that it was not
ruling on the legitimacy of “the EC’s mechanisms for the graduation
213
of developing countries,” its analysis of the Drug Arrangements
nonetheless intimated that graduation mechanisms are permissible as
a general matter. In its discussion of the “development, financial and
trade needs” of developing countries, the Appellate Body looked to
paragraph seven of the Enabling Clause, which confirms the
expectation that the beneficiary countries’ “capacity to make
contributions or concessions under the GATT will ‘improve with the
progressive development of their economies.’”214 In recognizing that
development will not occur “in lockstep” for all beneficiaries, the
Appellate Body suggested that the Enabling Clause permits the
graduation of high-performing countries.215
Of course, that graduation is likely permissible as a general
matter does not signify that any and all graduation schemes are valid.
Any measure taken under the Enabling Clause must comport with
paragraph 3(c), requiring developed countries to “respond positively
to the development, financial and trade needs of developing
216
countries.” Given that such needs must be evaluated on the basis of
objective criteria,217 the decision to graduate a country from the GSP
because it no longer has development needs should also be based on
objective criteria. The Appellate Body provides as examples of such

WTO law when interpreting terms in WTO agreements, they have not determined when nonWTO law might constitute a defense to a violation of WTO provisions). See generally JOOST
PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (concluding that a defendant
should be able to invoke non-WTO norms as defenses to WTO violations); John O. McGinnis,
The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The
Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 231 (2003) (arguing that customary international
law should not trump WTO and other multilateral agreements); Pauwelyn, supra, at 1019–28
(proposing four situations in which non-WTO law might prevail over WTO law).
213. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, paras. 128–29.
214. Id. para. 160 (quoting Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 7).
215. Id. para. 161.
216. Enabling Clause, supra note 21, para. 3(c).
217. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163.
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objective criteria “the WTO Agreement or . . . multilateral
218
instruments adopted by international organizations.”
The U.S. graduation mechanism, which relies on the World
Bank’s designation of countries as “‘high income’ countr[ies],”219 is,
quite plausibly, based on such objective criteria. Although this
designation is not formally adopted by World Bank members, the
international community widely recognizes it as a development
220
benchmark. More importantly, nearly all WTO members are also
members of the World Bank. Consequently, World Bank
classifications should qualify as objective criteria, and the U.S.
graduation mechanism should be valid under the Appellate Body’s
reasoning.
CONCLUSION
Although the developed countries technically lost round one in a
possible long-term fight over GSP schemes, many aspects of the
Appellate Body Report favor developed countries, particularly in
comparison to the overly strict Panel Report.221 The Appellate Body’s
emphasis on responding to objectively determined development
needs leaves open the possibility that some differentiation in GSP
schemes is consistent with the Enabling Clause. Nonetheless, the
report opens the door for developing countries to challenge regional
differentiation, conditionality, and graduation not based on “[b]roadbased recognition of a particular development need.”222 The
Appellate Body did little to clarify what such broad-based recognition
might entail. This Note argues that the Appellate Body should rely on
the “mutually acceptable” language in the 1971 waiver to limit
development needs to those about which developing countries have
agreed in some international context. Otherwise, the question of what
constitutes a development need could be left to the discretion of the

218. Id.
219. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (2000) (“graduating” countries that the World Bank has
designated as “high income” countries).
220. For example, the EC’s graduation mechanism also incorporates the World Bank
standards. See Council Regulation 2501/2001, supra note 11, art. 3.1, 2001 O.J. (L 346) at 2 (“A
beneficiary country shall be removed from Annex I where . . . the country is classified by the
World Bank as a high-income country . . . .”).
221. See supra note 132 (reporting the EC’s positive response to the Appellate Body
Report).
222. EC—GSP Appellate Body Report, supra note 3, para. 163.
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Appellate Body, threatening to undermine developed- and
developing-country efforts to identify joint development priorities.
In the context of the U.S. GSP, this analysis signifies that
regional differentiation is probably illegitimate but that graduation is
quite probably legitimate. The murkiest question is whether the
United States may condition the receipt of GSP preferences
altogether. Both Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause might sustain
some—but not all—conditions in the U.S. scheme, depending on how
the Appellate Body would resolve certain key issues. Although the
Appellate Body Report has no formal consequences for the U.S.
GSP, the U.S. scheme is vulnerable to future challenges from
developing countries that, like India, are dissatisfied with their
current place in the international trading system.

